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Abstract: Major innovations have pushed telecommunication costs down and demand up 
since the mid-1980s. The new segments of the mobile and the internet markets are hence 
suitable for oligopolistic competition. Reforms of the former public monopoly have been 
necessary to accommodate the entry of new operators. It is important to disentangle the 
effect of market liberalization that occurred in response to technological change and 
demand growth from the effects of privatizations resulting from structural adjustment 
programs. In line with popular opinion, privatization per se did not benefit consumers 
much. The biggest improvements for consumers have been driven by competition from 
mobile telecommunication firms. Governments should concentrate on liberalizing the 
mobile and internet segments. For the incumbent telecom operator, allocative inefficiency 
combined with the critical budgetary conditions found in most developing countries favour 
public ownership. This is an effective way of combining the regulation of the firm with a 
maximum level of taxation. 
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he percentage of countries that allowed private shareholders to own 
stakes in their incumbent telecommunication operator rose from 2% in 
1980 to 56% in 2001 (International Telecommunication Union, ITU 
2002). Simultaneously, markets worldwide have opened up to new entrants 
in the mobile and the internet segments. In the mobile market 78% of the 
201 countries included in the ITU database had adopted some degree of 
competition by 2001; while this figure was 86% in the internet market. The 
massive trend towards privatization and liberalization should not mask the 
fact that almost half of the countries in the world still have a public incumbent 
operator and that roughly 20%, mainly developing countries, have no private 
operator in their telecommunication industry at all. Similarly poor countries 
have limited their liberalization reforms to the mobile and internet segments. 
In the fixed telephony market over 60% of the world's countries have a 
monopoly.  
T
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The differences between telecommunication industrial policies from 
country to country raise the issue of how optimal reforms have been. Are 
poor countries lagging inefficiently behind, as is sometimes argued by the 
advocates of privatization, or is there a rationale for keeping the incumbent 
telecommunication operator public and monopolistic? The answer to this 
question is not clear. Assessment of reforms varies widely depending on the 
assessor. Since they have led to improvements in the financial and 
operating performances of divested firms, and in many cases also to 
network expansion, specialists tend to think that the reforms have been 
successful. This positive appraisal contrasts sharply with the popular view 
among consumers in developing countries, where there is a widespread 
perception that the reforms have hurt the poor, notably through increases in 
prices and unemployment, while benefiting the powerful and wealthy. In a 
2001 survey of 17 Latin American countries 63% of participants disagreed or 
strongly disagreed with the statement: "The privatization of state companies 
has been beneficial" (The Economist, July 28th-August 3rd 2001, p. 38). 
Similarly in Africa, reforms have been qualified as "re-colonization" due to 
the participation of foreign investors in many cases. It seems hard to 
reconcile consumer dissatisfaction with specialists' contentment. On the 
other hand, the unpopularity of the reforms cannot be disregarded by those 
who promote decentralization and democracy. This paper thus aims to 
clarify this issue. It analyses the advantages and drawbacks of 
telecommunication privatization and market liberalization in developing 
countries. 
?  Privatization and consumers' surplus:  
allocative versus productive efficiency 
Productive efficiency 
Transfer of public ownership to private ownership has generally been 
grounded in the poor economic performance of public enterprises. A critical 
problem induced by public ownership, first identified by KORNAI (1980), is 
the lack of any commitment on the part of the government not to bail out or 
subsidize money-losing firms. This commitment problem is referred to in 
literature on the subject as the soft-budget constraint (interesting surveys are 
available in KORNAI, 2000; KORNAI, MASKIN & ROLAND, 2002): 
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"The softening of the budget constraint appears when the strict 
relationship between expenditure and earnings of an economic unit 
(firms, household, etc.) has been relaxed, because expenditure will be 
paid by some other institutions, typically the paternalistic state." 
(KORNAI, 1980).  
The author shows that soft-budget constraints explain many inefficiencies 
occurring in socialist economies such as shortages or low price 
responsiveness. KORNAI (2001) provides evidence of the use of soft-budget 
constraints by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in developing countries. 
Since less efficient firms have been allowed to rely on the government for 
funding, they lack the financial discipline required for efficient management 
(DEWATRIPONT & MASKIN, 1995; SCHMIDT, 1996). In DEWATRIPONT & 
MASKIN (1995) and MASKIN (1999) the soft-budget constraint is caused by 
the contract incompleteness between governments and firms. In these two 
papers soft budget constraints affect the level of un-contractible investments 
made in firms by managers. By hardening the firm's budget constraint, 
privatization helps to restore appropriate investment incentives and improves 
production efficiency. Another part of the theoretical literature stresses that 
public ownership is associated with a lack of economic orientation in 
governments' objectives. For instance, in KORNAI & WEIBULL (1983), 
SHLEIFER & VISHNY (1996), DEBANDE & FRIEBEL (2003), governments 
are described as adopting 'paternalistic' or political behaviour as they seek to 
protect or increase employment; in SHAPIRO & WILLIG (1990), 
governments are simply malevolent. 
The main conclusion of this theoretical literature is that privatization 
improves the internal efficiency of firms. Empirical evidence supports this 
result. MEGGINSTON & NETTER (2001) offer an extensive review of the 
literature available on the subject covering 61 empirical studies at a 
company level (both within and across countries). They conclude that 
privatized firms are more productive and profitable than public firms in both 
developed and developing countries. This result, which is theoretically robust 
and empirically grounded, seems incontestable 1. 
                     
1 This does not mean that privatization always improves firm performance. In three studies, 
looking at 204 privatizations in 41 countries, between 1/5 and 1/3 of privatized firms have 
registered very slight to no improvement, and even occasionally, worsening situations 
(MEGGINSON & NETTER, 2001). 
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Allocative efficiency 
It is indisputable that privatization tends to improve firms performance. In 
contrast the assumption made by advocates of privatization, namely that 
efficiency gains are automatically transmitted to consumers, merits further 
discussion. Let us assume for a moment that the social objective of 
government is to maximize the surplus of trade. In a perfectly competitive 
market where price equates marginal cost, it is true that consumers benefit 
from the efficiency gain generated by privatization. However, in increasing 
return to scale industries, moving from public to private ownership does not 
offer a solution to the lack of competitive pressure. In the absence of 
government intervention, the number of firms that survive in equilibrium is 
small. Their rent seeking behaviour leads to high prices and allocative 
inefficiency and such market imperfections hurt consumers. Empirical 
studies hence reveal that privatization results in lower prices and higher 
output in competitive industries, but not in oligopolistic ones (see NELLIS, 
1999). For instance, NEWBERY & POLLITT (1997) estimate the welfare 
consequences of the privatization of the UK electricity sector. They conclude 
that there were permanent gains equal to 5 percent of previous total 
generation costs, but at least in the first few years following privatization the 
new private shareholders reaped most of the gains, and both 
government/taxpayers and consumers lost out 2. 
The fixed line telephone is characterized by large economies of scale. 
Since WALRAS (1936) such infrastructure industries have been referred to 
as natural monopolies. According to traditional regulation literature, a legal 
monopoly should be set to prevent wasteful duplication of investments. It 
thus seems natural that over 60% of the world's countries maintain a 
monopoly in the fixed line telephone segment (44% fully public and 16% with 
private participation). Moreover the legal monopoly should be regulated to 
avoid the deadweight loss created by monopoly pricing. Under the complete 
contract approach adopted in literature (see LAFFONT & TIROLE, 1993), 
there is no difference between public ownership and private ownership 
under regulation of entry and price. The result is important because it 
illuminates that ownership is not the key to the allocative efficiency problem; 
in increasing return to scale industries regulation is the key. Empirical 
evidence supports this result. Using a sample of 30 African and Latin 
                     
2 The authors argue that the government underpriced the shares in order to ensure political 
success. The outcry in Britain concerning the windfall gains to shareholders in this privatization 
helped Tony Blair's Labour party regain power. It also led to the imposition of a special tax on 
the profit of the shareholders (see BIRDSALL & NELLIS, 2002). 
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American countries, WALLSTEN (2001), for instance, finds that privatization 
alone is uncorrelated with improvements in the telecommunication sector, 
and, in fact is negatively correlated with mainlines per capita and connection 
capacity. However, privatization combined with a separate regulator is 
positively correlated with connection capacity and payphone penetration. 
Similarly the experience in industrialized countries shows that regulation, 
especially the regulation of access pricing to bottleneck facilities (for 
example, the fixed distribution network) is a key component of successful 
liberalization reforms. The result is worrying because governments in 
developing countries, which used to control prices and production in 
telecommunication through public ownership, have not been very successful 
in establishing regulatory institutions. They usually lack the human 
resources, the experience and the credibility necessary to control large 
corporations. A major concern with privatization reforms has been 
government commitment ability. According to a World Bank database on 
Latin America, the concessions that were granted to private operators 
following the divestiture of public firms were renegotiated after an average of 
only 2.1 years (see LAFFONT, 2001; GUASH, LAFFONT & STRAUB, 2002). 
This problem is reinforced by the fact that, in practice, governments in 
developing countries are not focused on consumer surplus. 
Opportunity cost of public funds 
Government pursues multiple objectives, such as the production of public 
goods, the regulation of non-competitive industries or the control of 
externalities, under a single budget constraint. Since the latter usually binds 
the opportunity cost of the public funds (i.e., the Lagrange multiplier 
associated with the constraint) is strictly positive. Concretely increasing 
investment in infrastructure such as a telecommunication network means 
decreasing the production of essential public goods such as national 
security, law enforcement, of commodities that generate externality such as 
health care and education, or alternatively, increasing the level of taxes or 
debt. All these actions have a social cost, which must be traded off with the 
social benefit. Symmetrically when the government is able to tax an industry 
such as the telecommunication industry it can increase its investment in 
education, health care or other areas. The social benefit generated by this 
investment must be compared with the reduction in consumer surplus 
generated by taxes. Contrary to the price mechanism, government 
intervention is not, and cannot be, anonymous; it depends on the opportunity 
cost of public funds. 
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The opportunity cost of public funds, defined as the Lagrange multiplier of 
the government budget constraint, is higher when, everything else being 
equal, government revenue is lower 3.Tax revenue as a proportion of GDP is 
typically much lower in developing countries than in rich countries. The tax 
revenue-GDP ratio for 1995, for example, was 36.1 % for OECD countries 
(see official statistics on the OECD website) versus 18.2 % 1995-1997 for 
developing countries (TANZI & ZEE, 2001 based on a sample). The 
difference in taxation level reflects the fact that taxation is a non-convex 
activity (see WARLTERS & AURIOL, 2005). Drawing the first euro involves 
sunk cost. For instance, to transform the informal sector into a formal one 
firstly requires investment in education, so that all firms' managers are able 
to keep records. The government must also provide incentives for firms to 
register officially, train inspectors to control corporate activities etc. 
Developing countries are too poor to invest heavily in education, or even in 
their tax administration. They cannot match OECD countries' direct taxation 
level. Other sources of public funds are crucial to them. This includes 
revenue from public firms. The following sections examine how macro-
economic budgetary constraints affect privatization decisions. 
?  Privatization and government revenue:  
the fiscal argument 
AURIOL & PICARD (2002) study the impact of poor public budgetary 
conditions on the privatization decisions of infrastructures and public utilities. 
Their paper offers a theoretical analysis of the relationship between the 
financial constraints of a country and its industrial policy. The opportunity 
cost of public funds summarizes the tightness of government budget 
constraints, with larger costs stemming from tighter constraints. Utilitarian 
governments maximize the sum of net consumers' surplus and of transfers 
to the firm weighted by the opportunity cost of public funds. The paper then 
focuses on the impact of the opportunity cost of public funds on the 
privatization decision. It shows that the privatization of natural monopolies 
                     
3 The opportunity cost of public fund is different from the marginal cost of public fund (i.e., the 
dead weight loss created by increasing marginally a specific tax). The MCF is a general 
equilibrium concept. It is relevant in the long run because it indicates the social cost (or benefit) 
of tax reform (for more on the MCFs in developing countries see WARLTERS & AURIOL, 
2005). However in the short run the taxation level is more or less fixed. The Lagrange multiplier 
of the government budget constraint, referred to as the opportunity cost of the public funds, then 
is the relevant parameter for cost benefit analysis. 
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with price liberalization depends on firm profitability and on the tightness of 
the government budget constraint. This implies that optimal industrial policy 
is generally different in rich and in poor countries. 
In the model the government assumes responsibility for a public firm's 
profits and losses. It subsidizes the firm in case of loss and sizes its profit in 
case of benefit. Disturbed by the situation of incomplete information, the 
government can hardly discriminate between high and low cost firms. This 
creates an incentive problem. Ex-post, it transfers too many resources to 
firms (through subsidies, for example). In contrast managers and/or owners 
of privatized firms assume responsibility for the firm's cash flows. One 
benefit of privatization is that it reduces government subsidies to money 
loosing firms. For instance, the privatization commission of Burkina Faso, 
reported that government subsidies to SOEs dropped from 1.42 percent of 
GDP in 1991 to 0.08 percent of GDP in 1999 as a result of privatization 
(OECD-BAD, 2003). However, privatization has a price. On the one hand, 
the government is not able to take advantage of positive cash flows in 
profitable firms. On the other hand, it abandons direct control of the firm's 
operations, especially prices, which has a cost to consumers. Indeed 
empirical evidence shows that the output prices of natural monopolies 
increased as a result of privatization 4. 
Prices are sometimes increased ahead of privatization in order to reduce 
the SOEs financing gaps and attract buyers. This, for instance, was the case 
with electricity tariffs in Zimbabwe, Kenya and Senegal, which the 
government increased by 10% after reaching an agreement with Vivendi 
Universal (see OECD-BAD, 2003). An unaccounted part of price increases 
stemmed from the termination of illegal connections (BIRDSALL & NELLIS, 
2002; ESTACHE et al, 2002; OECD-BAD 2003). Privatization in developing 
countries should be treated as the move from public ownership with 
regulation of entry and price to private ownership with price liberalization. It 
not only involves a transfer of ownership, but also includes price 
deregulation. Nevertheless it is not equivalent to laissez-faire because entry 
remains regulated (through licence and entry fees). 
One question addressed in the paper is whether the elimination of 
subsidies to unprofitable firms and the cash-flow generated by the sale can 
compensate for the price distortion associated with privatization and the loss 
                     
4 "Steep price increases following privatization have been quite common in divested network or 
infrastructure industries, e.g. electricity and water and sewerage, and common but not universal 
in telecommunications." (BIRDSALL & NELLIS, 2002). 
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of revenue from profitable public firms. The answer is positive. This result is 
not obvious because a benevolent regulation should be able, at worse, to 
mimic the private monopoly outcome. This is at least what the revelation 
principle suggests. However, because of the ex-post profitability constraint in 
SOEs (and not in private structures), this intuition turns out to be false. When 
public finance matters, privatization without price control can dominate a 
benevolent regulation. The optimal decision depends on the profitability of 
the industry. 
Low profitability segment 
When the profitability of a market segment is low, the optimal industrial 
policy is monotone in the opportunity cost of public funds. For low 
opportunity cost public ownership dominates privatization, while the reverse 
is true of high opportunity cost. This implies that governments in developing 
countries should get rid of their unprofitable public firms, which in practice 
they do. One third of the privatizations to end 1996 in Africa, for example, 
were liquidations or asset sales of unprofitable firms (SARBIB, 1997). The 
result also applies to investment with low anticipated profitability. For 
instance governments with abundant fiscal resources subsidize the 
construction of a new infrastructure and let consumers use it at marginal 
cost. This policy maximizes the consumer surplus, which in the case of low 
opportunity cost of public funds, is equal to utilitarian social welfare. On the 
other hand, when the opportunity cost of public funds is high, the 
government objective function is titled towards transfers. Subsidizing the 
infrastructure is socially costly. Privatization is an appealing alternative to the 
scarcity of public funds. To illustrate this point consider the limit case where 
the government cannot finance an extension of the fixed-line telephone 
network, for instance in a rural area. If a private company is eager to expand 
the network in exchange for the freedom to charge monopoly pricing it is 
optimal to let the firm do so. Indeed, it is better to have a privately owned 
and operated infrastructure, even with the monopoly distortion, than no 
infrastructure at all. By continuity the result still holds when the government 
is able to finance the infrastructure. The drawback of this policy is that it 
increases inequality (the rich have access to new services while the poor are 
deprived from them). To avoid popular outcry the government should 
consider subsidizing access for the poorest segment of the population. The 
subsidies can be financed with public funds when there are enough of them 
(see AURIOL & PICARD, 2005) or by the wealthiest segment of demand 
(namely cross-subsidies). It is worth noting that OECD countries have 
traditionally relied on cross-subsidies. The U.S. Congress, for example, 
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directed the Federal Communications Commission to subsidize internet 
services to schools and libraries in the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The 
internet access discount, estimated at USD 2.25 billion per year, was funded 
by an increase in the price of interstate telephony services. HAUSMAN 
(1997) estimated that this indirect taxation cost USD 2.36 billion (in addition 
to the USD2.25 billion granted to schools and libraries). Taxation by 
regulation arises because Congress wants to implement social programs, 
but is unwilling (unable) to increase general taxes. Implementing cross-
subsidies calls for close monitoring of firms' pricing policy. Governments in 
developing countries eager to do perform this task first need to establish an 
efficient regulatory authority. 
Profitable monopoly 
When the public utility is profitable in the natural monopoly segment of 
the service, the optimal industrial policy is non-monotone in the opportunity 
cost of public funds. The result is a consequence of the difficulties 
encountered by developing countries in attracting investors while auctioning 
off their profitable state owned enterprises (SOEs). Indeed, country risk 
analysis is very important in today's global investment strategies because it 
forms the basis of determining future expected returns on investment. Since 
the perception of business risk is higher in poor countries, as for instance 
illustrated by the International Country Risk Guide, this negatively affects the 
supply and cost of international capital flows for these countries. Empirical 
studies thus show that SOEs are generally sold at a discount (see 
BIRDSALL & NELLIS, 2002). With under priced public assets, AURIOL & 
PICARD (2002) show that the optimal policy is non-monotone in the 
opportunity cost of public funds 5. When the opportunity cost of public funds 
is low, the government sets prices close to marginal cost and subsidizes the 
regulated firm to cover fixed costs. Rises in the opportunity cost of public 
funds increase the social cost of such transfers. The government prefers to 
let a private firm take over for intermediate values. Finally, for large values 
the government, which focuses on revenue, prefers to keep profitable firms 
public rather than to sell them off. Prices are set close to the private 
monopoly level in order to maximize profit and thus government revenue. 
For low and high value opportunity cost scenarios (i.e. when bailouts are 
cheap or when 'hold-up' on profitable industries are valuable) public 
                     
5 On the other hand if a government is able to sell a SOE for its full expected profits, the optimal 
industrial policy is monotone in the shadow cost of public funds. 
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ownership is preferred to privatization. The reverse holds true for 
intermediate opportunity cost. 
The non-monotonicity result has important policy implications for the 
telecommunication industry. In other words, while divestiture of the profitable 
public firm may be optimal in developed countries, it is not necessarily ideal 
in developing countries, where budget constraints are tight and market 
institutions weak. This result is especially relevant for the traditional local 
and international segment of telecommunication industry. 
"A PTT [Post and Telecommunication Company]'s yearly revenues 
(especially charges from international calls) were used by governments 
to subsidize mail services, or ease yearly budget deficits. Given this 
public convenience and necessity, the interests of third world 
governments are often diametrically opposed to telecom policies of 
privatization and the network deregulation favoured by wealthy 
nations.'' (ANANIA, 1992). 
It is wrong to believe that the governments of advanced economies do 
not care for the revenues generated by the telecommunications industry and 
focus on consumer surplus. The fiscal argument works for every country in 
the world. The difference between them lies in the weight that this argument 
assumes. In the USA, for example, a federal excise tax on local and long 
distance telephony services was created in 1898. It has been repealed 
occasionally and re-enacted ever since. The tax's opponents argue that it is 
regressive and distortive; while its proponents insist on the need for 
revenues in order to reduce federal budget deficits. It is hard to get around 
this argument: at a tax rate of 3% tax collection reached USD 5.185 billion in 
fiscal year 1999 (reported in the Budget of the United States Government, 
fiscal year 2000) 6. It would be unfair and stupid to ask developing countries 
to focus on their consumer surplus, while advanced economies have always 
relied on the telecommunications industry for fiscal resources 7. As they are 
not able to tax as efficiently as advanced economies, developing countries 
need the additional revenues more badly. For instance, over the period 
                     
6 Similarly in Australia the communication industry has the highest company tax to profit ratio 
equal to 0.49. In company tax alone each firm in the industry paid on average Australian $40 
millions (2002-03 income year), more than the double of the average of the second largest 
contributors (i.e., the mining industry). Finally in 2000 the UK mobile sector alone generated 
£1.3 billion in tax revenue. See: 
http://www.intellectuk.org/sectors/sector_telecommunications_1.asp 
7 Until recently telecommunications companies were public in virtually all countries in the world 
(with the important exception of the US). The telecom public utility being traditionally profitable, 
it provided a steady flow of public funds throughout the years. 
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1990-1995, revenues collected from public firms (among them the 
telecommunications industry is traditionally a large contributor) amounted to 
8% of GDP in Bolivia, 2.2% in Brazil, 5% in Chile, 1% in India, 3% in Mexico, 
3% in Peru (World Bank, 1998).  
"On the whole this non-tax revenue is more important for developing 
than opposed to industrial countries, comprising about 21 percent 
compared to 10 percent of total revenue.'' (BURGESS & STERN, 1993 
p. 782). 
Profitable duopoly 
When ex-ante profitability rises substantially, the market allows for the 
entry of more than one firm. AURIOL & PICARD (2002) show that the 
advantage of private unregulated structures disappears. Indeed, when a 
second firm is introduced, the costs of information and of ex-post profitability 
constraint in regulated firms diminish more than the costs of excessive 
prices and entry to private oligopolies. In other words, market liberalization, 
which corresponds to the divestiture of an historical monopoly and the 
introduction of new entrants, is not equivalent to laissez-faire. In the 
framework of our model the divestiture of the historical monopoly is 
motivated by smaller fixed costs and/or by larger product demand. The 
mobile and the internet segment of the telecommunication industry are a 
good illustration of these changes. Indeed, with wireless technology sunk 
costs fall. Depending on the size of demand (i.e., country population and 
wealth) several suppliers can efficiently compete in the same market. Hence 
in the mobile segment 78% of countries had adopted some degree of 
competition in 2001 versus 86% in the internet segment. 
The paper suggests that privatization and liberalization reforms in these 
segments of the market cannot succeed without effective regulation of entry 
and prices. The result is counter intuitive. It would seem more natural to 
regulate the outcome of the private monopoly (i.e., in the low profitability 
case) than that of the duopoly (i.e., in the high profitability case). Indeed, 
with several firms one could expect competitive pressure to push prices 
down. This is true to some extent: prices decrease when the industry moves 
from a private monopoly to a private duopoly. However, unregulated 
competition (e.g. Cournot) is inefficient compared to regulation. The 
privatization outcome is obviously worse when operators collude or are 
granted exclusivity periods, as is often the case in developing countries. To 
avoid the dead-weight loss created by monopoly pricing, it is necessary to 
regulate the market, especially access to bottleneck facilities (e.g. the fixed 
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line network). Indeed new entrants need to be able to interconnect with the 
incumbent telecommunication firm in order to reach their customers. If the 
latter is privatized, it has every incentive to prevent competition from mobile 
operators. This is a major concern because recent empirical studies show 
that the biggest improvements in the telecommunication sector have been 
driven by competition from mobile telecommunication firms, not by 
privatization reforms (see LI & XU, 2001; McNARY, 2001; PETRAZZINI, 
1996; ROS, 1999; WALLSTEN, 2001). Since the revenues generated by the 
telecommunication industry represent over 2% of world GDP, inefficient 
entry and high prices in the mobile segment generate large social costs. 
FUSS, MESCHI & WAVERMAN (2005), for instance, estimate that in a 
typical developing country, an increase of ten mobile phones per 100 people 
boosts growth by 0.6 percentage points. The growth dividend is similar to 
that of fixed-line telephones in developed countries in the 1970s. 
?  Empirical assessment of reforms 
To make a general appraisal of the reforms LI & XU (2002) calculate the 
difference between pre- and post-privatization mean of key performance 
variables and test whether the difference is zero based on a sub-sample of 
some 60 countries that experienced full or partial privatization in the 
telecommunications sector. Based on this simple test privatization is 
associated with a substantial reduction in employment (nearly 50 percent) 
and with a sharp increase in investment. Interestingly it is also associated 
with a 38 percent reduction in real output.  
This result is consistent with the finding by BIRDSALL & NELLIS (2002) 
that the output prices of infrastructure industries increased as a result of 
privatization. Since the reduction in real output is lower than the reduction in 
employment, privatization is associated with a significant increase in labour 
productivity (42 percent). The pre and post-privatization mean testing does 
not establish causality, it shows correlation. However, the results do help to 
reconcile the experts' positive evaluation with the unpopularity of the 
reforms. Indeed, privatized telecommunication firms seem to be more 
productive and to invest more in network coverage. This is an improvement 
for the population, which in turn gains access to the service. Yet they also 
get rid of redundant employees, increase prices and disconnect those who 
cannot afford their bills. Prices rise decreases the surplus of consumers who 
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had access to the service before privatization. Disconnections and labour 
downsizing hurt the poor 8. 
So far the empirical results are consistent with both efficiency and the 
fiscal theory 9. This raises the question of what triggers the privatization 
decision in the first place. The question is empirically relevant because the 
conduct and performance of the reforms vary with their objectives. The few 
empirical papers that study this problem do not focus on the 
telecommunications industry. They suggest that the macro economic 
rationale put forward in AURIOL & PICARD (2002) plays a significant role in 
the decision whether to privatize. Based on a data set from privatizations in 
China, LI, LI, LUI & WANG (2001), for instance, test whether government 
privatizes in order to enhance production efficiency or to increase its 
revenue. They conclude: 
 "Our tests based on the data set from China reject the efficiency 
theory and yield support for the revenue theory."  
Similarly BORTOLOTTI, FANTINI & SINISCALCO (2003) analyze panel 
data for privatization around the world. They consider all types of industry 
(competitive and oligopolistic) and all kinds of countries (rich and poor). The 
authors find that privatization is more likely in wealthy democracies with right 
wing governments, high debt, liquid stock markets and a legal system that 
protects shareholders. Finally WARLTERS (2004) studies the determinants 
of infrastructure privatization using probit regressions with panel data 
covering 155 developing countries for the years 1984-1998. He shows that 
the introduction of a VAT system positively influences the probability of 
infrastructure privatization. This result illuminates the link existing between 
taxation and privatization reforms. WARLTERS (2004), who interprets the 
introduction of a VAT system as an improvement in the tax system, 
concludes that:  
"Infrastructure privatization is more likely when the shadow cost of 
public funds falls."  
                     
8 As BIRDSALL & NELLIS (2002) put it: “Most privatization programs have done much more to 
enhance efficiency than equity. At least initially, and on average, privatization has worsened 
wealth distribution (highly likely) and income distribution (likely).” 
9 That is, after the privatization firms use more efficiently their inputs. They also pay franchise 
fees and make more investment than the financially strapped governments. Finally, they 
increase prices so that output decreases. 
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The three papers support the idea that macro-economic concerns 
influence the decision to privatize. However, with the exception of LI, LI, LUI 
& WANG (2001), they do not control for efficiency. To test which theory 
prevails requires micro-economic data on public firms on top of the usual 
macro-economic data,. These data are usually not available. A notable 
exception, which is exploited in AURIOL & TUSKE (2005), is the data on the 
telecommunications industry. 
AURIOL & TUSKE (2005) estimate the probability of telecommunication 
privatization in developing countries using data from three primary sources. 
Firstly, the International Telecommunication Union maintains a rich panel 
data set on the worldwide telecommunication industry. The database 
contains detailed information for every country in the world on telephone 
service revenue, quantity, annual telecom investment, infrastructure quality 
such as teledensity, the number of telephone mainlines etc.. The data are 
industry based. Since the public firm used to be in a monopoly position, the 
data provide detailed company information before privatization. Secondly, 
the World Development Indicators (WDI) maintained by the World Bank 
provide the matching macro economic panel data required to test the 
relevance of the fiscal argument. Finally, the dependant variable is 
constructed by extracting information relative to the telecommunication 
industry from the World Bank's Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) 
database. The probability of privatization is estimated with random effects 
probit models. The panel data covers 153 developing or transition countries 
for the year 1985-2003. It contains privatization data from PPI, industry level 
information from the ITU, and macro-economic information from the WDI. 
The theoretical predictions differ depending on which theory prevails. If the 
efficiency argument is determinant firms with poor economic performances 
should be privatized first. On the other hand, if AURIOL & PICARD's (2002) 
fiscal argument is relevant, macro-economic variables measuring the 
tightness of government budget constraints should significantly influence the 
probability of privatization. A more subtle implication of AURIOL & PICARD 
(2002) arises while focusing on the incumbent operator of the 
telecommunications industry. Indeed the fixed-line and the long distance 
segment traditionally constitute a profitable monopoly. Depending on the 
opportunity cost of public funds, privatization of the incumbent operator 
might be the optimal policy in a rich country, while the same does not 
necessarily apply to a poor one. AURIOL & PICARD (2002) show that the 
optimal decision depends on a critical value of the opportunity cost of public 
funds. Under the paper's assumptions, the critical value lies in the range of 
the opportunity cost of public funds generally retained for developed 
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economies (i.e., it varies between 0.35 and 1.10). If the model assumptions 
are empirically grounded the probability of privatizing the fixed-line and the 
long distance segment in developing countries should decrease with the 
opportunity cost of public funds 10. 
AURIOL & TUSKE (2005) found that the probability of privatization of the 
fixed access and long distance segments decreases with country risk rating, 
with the level of multilateral debt service, or alternatively, with the level of 
public and publicly guaranteed debt. As predicted by the theory, the 
probability of privatization declines when the opportunity cost of public funds, 
measured by the level of debt service for example, rises. The result is robust 
when the characteristics of firms are analysed. In this case it is worth noting 
that the probability of privatization increases with the level of teledensity , the 
percentage of digital mainlines and the level of annual investment, but 
decreases with the level of the telephone waiting list. To confirm these 
results regressions were run with the micro-economic variables alone. They 
yield the same qualitative results. The probability of privatization increases 
with teledensity, annual telecommunication investment and the percentage 
of digital main lines, but decreases with the size of the telephone waiting list. 
In other words developing countries privatize efficient incumbent 
telecommunication firms first. It is doubtful that the firms' efficiency is at the 
heart of the privatization decision. On the other hand, the results are 
consistent with governments maximizing sale revenues. Developing 
countries, which are coping with critical financial problems, rationally regard 
privatization as a fiscal instrument. 
Whether governments privatize public assets to unbind their budget 
constraints or to increase industry performance and consumers' surplus is 
crucial to the conduct of reforms. For instance, in privatization of public 
utilities governments have the choice between auctioning off the operator on 
the basis of the highest royalty payment, or waiving the royalty payment and 
auctioning off the service to the party who bids the lowest service tariff (see 
ESTACHE, FOSTER & WODON, 2002). In a survey of 600 concession 
contracts from around the world, GUASCH (2000) shows that, in most 
cases, contracts are tendered for the highest transfer or annual fee. In 
practice, governments in developing countries are more concerned with 
relieving fiscal constraint than securing tariff reductions. The proceeds of 
                     
10 The prediction is reversed for advanced economies as suggested by BORTOLOTTI, 
FANTINI & SINISCALCO (2003) where the probability of privatization increases with the level of 
debt. 
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privatization in non-OECD countries, which account for over one third of the 
worldwide proceeds of privatization (MAHBOOBI, 2000; GIBBON, 1998, 
2000), have hence been used to alleviate fiscal pressure on the public 
sector 11. Using a panel of 18 developing countries, DAVIS et al. (2000) 
show that the budgetary proceeds of privatization have been used to reduce 
domestic financing on a roughly one-for-one basis. Since the transfers are 
higher the greater the expected profitability of the industry, governments 
committed to privatize choose policies that are likely to increase the firms' 
profitability. 
Privatizations initially often come with exclusivity periods (i.e., temporary 
monopoly power). To study the impact of the exclusivity period on 
privatization price, WALLSTEN (2000) focuses on the privatization of twenty 
telecom firms in fifteen developing countries. In this small sample 2/3 of the 
countries chose to allocate exclusivity periods for an average of 7.42 years. 
They apparently had a very good reason for doing so. According to the 
author's computations, granting a monopoly in fixed local service would 
more than double the price private investors pay for the firm. Granting an 
international long distance service monopoly would be even more valuable 
than a local monopoly. The advantage of exclusivity periods seen in the sale 
price comes at the cost of reducing network growth relative to privatization 
without exclusivity periods. A one percent increase in the length of the 
exclusivity period is associated in the sample with a 0.05 to 0.08 percent 
decrease in network growth. Doubling the exclusivity period should 
consequently reduce network growth by five to eight percent. When the 
sample is broadened to include advanced economies, the proportion of 
countries that choose to allocate an exclusivity period is lower. For instance 
in the LI & XU (2002) sample, which covers 116 countries from 1981 to 
1998, of all countries that privatized in 1998 one-third offered investors 
exclusive access to certain segments of the market. Consistently with 
WALLSTEN (2000), their calculations show that the impact of exclusivity 
periods on the number of fixed line and mobile telephones per 100 
inhabitants is negative and significant. 
Secondly governments often restructure public firms in an attempt to 
increase privatization prices. CHONG & GALDO (2003) analyse the impact 
of labour policies, such as downsizing, pay cuts, or employment guarantees, 
on the privatization prices in 84 telecommunications privatizations. The 
                     
11 A review by the IMF (2000) of 18 privatizing countries reports that the net receipts from 
privatization account for 1 percent of GDP. 
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sample covers 75 percent of the privatizations worldwide that occurred 
between 1984 and 2000. In their sample 73% of the firms experienced 
labour downsizing in the three years prior to privatization. When checking for 
endogeneity, the authors show that restructuring, in the form of specific 
labour policies before privatization, is not conductive to higher net 
privatization prices. On the contrary, in the particular case of voluntary 
downsizing, it significantly decreases prices (by 15 percent). This result is 
consistent with the lemon problem studied by JEON & LAFFONT (1999) and 
RAMA (1999): The best employees, who are aware of their productivity, are 
the first to take severance packages and leave voluntarily. This theory is 
supported by the fact that many exiting employees were re-hired after the 
privatizations. The authors also find that, firms' characteristics such as the 
presence of unions and of negative net liabilities, decrease like expected net 
privatization prices. More interestingly, the type of method used in the sale 
seems to matter. Public offerings and direct sale are associated with an 
increase in the privatization price; shares sold are associated with lower 
prices. Foreign participation is not significant. The authors conclude that 
governments eager to privatize their telecommunication industry should 
concentrate on the privatization process, as the method of sale seems to 
matter. On the other hand, they should avoid restructuring the public firm. 
This is a costly process, especially in developing countries where labour 
downsizing hurts the extended family of those who are fired. Since reforms 
had either a negative impact or no affect on privatization prices, restructuring 
prior to privatization has proven bad policy. Yet it occurred in nearly 3/4 of 
the telecommunication privatizations covered by the authors and its poor 
results partly explain the unpopularity of reforms. 
?  Conclusion 
Among network industries, telecommunication has undergone the most 
dramatic change since the mid-1980s. Major innovations, embodied in the 
wireless technology or the internet, have pushed costs down and demand 
up. The new segments of the mobile and the internet markets are hence 
suitable for (oligopolistic) competition. Network externalities in 
telecommunications oblige entrants to interconnect with the incumbent 
operator in order to reach their customers. Major reforms of the former public 
monopoly have been necessary to accommodate the entry of the new 
operators. These liberalization reforms, which occurred at an industry level, 
have been intertwined with structural adjustment programs. Indeed, 
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international donors and creditors, like the World Bank or the IMF, made 
privatization programs a condition for economic assistance in the 1980s 
context of explosive debt crisis. As shown by AURIOL & TUSKE (2005), the 
macro-economic rationale is at the heart of the decision to privatize in the 
telecommunication industry. In this context it is hard to disentangle the effect 
of market liberalization that occurred in response to technological change 
and demand growth from the effects of privatizations resulting from global 
government restructuring. 
A careful review of existing empirical literature reveals that 
telecommunication privatization in developing countries came, at least 
initially, with a substantial employment reduction, price increases and a 
reduction in real output. Since output decreases were generally lower than 
job cuts, labour productivity rose as predicted by the efficiency theory. The 
owners of the firms seem to have been the main beneficiaries of the 
productivity gains. In line with popular opinion, privatization per se did not 
seem to benefit consumers much. On the contrary, WALLSTEN (2001) finds 
it to be negatively correlated with mainlines per capita and connection 
capacity. Similarly CHONG & GALDO (2003) show that restructuring public 
firms before privatization, as has often been the case in developing 
countries, has proved bad policy. Not only is labour downsizing been 
conductive to higher net privatization prices, but in the particular case of 
voluntary downsizing, it significantly decreases prices. In the end, the 
biggest improvements for consumers have been driven by competition from 
mobile telecommunication firms, not by the privatization of the incumbent 
firm (see LI & XU, 2001; McNARY, 2001; PETRAZZINI, 1996; ROS, 1999; 
WALLSTEN, 2001). 
To conclude, privatization reforms must take into account the fiscal 
argument. In profitable, increasing return to scale industries, such as the 
fixed line telephone or the long distance segment, allocative inefficiency 
combined with the critical budgetary conditions found in most developing 
countries favour public ownership. This is an effective way of combining the 
regulation of the firm with a maximum level of taxation. AURIOL & TUSKE 
(2005) thus found that the probability of privatization declines in the fixed line 
segment when the opportunity of public funds rises. Instead of rushing into 
the privatization of their incumbent telecom operator, governments should 
concentrate on liberalizing the mobile and internet segments. Indeed, 
increasing the competitive pressure from mobile operators is the best way to 
increase consumer surplus and growth. This concretely means avoiding 
allocating exclusivity periods to private operators in the mobile segment and 
creating an efficient regulatory authority to avoid overpricing of bottleneck 
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facilities (such as the fixed line network) and collusive behaviour from mobile 
operators. China and Viet Nam followed this winning strategy. They chose to 
keep the fixed line operator public and monopolistic while fostering 
(regulated) competition in the mobile segment. According to the ITU (2002), 
these two countries experienced the highest change in ranking for total 
teledensity (the sum of fixed lines and mobile users per 100 inhabitants) in 
the world with China moving up from a ranking of 159 in 1990 to 95 in 2000; 
while Viet Nam jumped up from 189 to 141. They are also countries where 
the government gains maximum revenues from the telecommunication 
industry. 
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